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Summary 
A workshop was convened at Ames Research Center on 
September 28 and 29, 1993, to address the unexplained 
electrical anomalies experienced in December 1978 by 
the four Pioneer Venus probes below a Venus altitude of 
12.5 km. These anomalies caused the loss of valuable 
data in the deep atmosphere, and, if their cause were to 
remain unexplained, could reoccur on future Venus 
missions. The workshop participants reviewed the evi- 
dence and studied all identified mechanisms that could 
consistently account for all observed anomalies. Both 
hardware problems and atmospheric interactions were 
considered. Based on a workshop recommendation, 
subsequent testing identified the cause as being an 
insulation failure of the external harness. All anomalous 
events are now explained. 
Introduction 
The Pioneer Venus probe mission has been widely 
recognized in the atmospheric science community as 
highly successful and productive. It established a new 
level of knowledge of the upper, middle, and lower 
atmospheres of Venus, replacing in many instances 
uncertain knowledge or speculation with measurements 
and observations. Areas in which there were major 
advances included thermal structure and stability of the 
atmosphere, cloud altitudes, particle densities and sizes, 
composition (major and trace species), horizontal winds 
and vertical velocities, the detection and characterization 
of wave systems, and the penetration and balance of solar 
and thermal radiation. 
The anomalies that were the subject of this workshop 
were unexplained behaviors of the external sensors at and 
below 12.5 km altitude. Below this common altitude, 
instruments outside the sealed pressure vessels exhibited 
*San Jose State University Foundation. 
t Space Science Center, University of Wisconsin, Madison. 
SArnes Research Center. 
SMCAT Institute. 
qJet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology. 
problems on all four probes. Indicated temperatures 
dropped discontinuously, but the sensors continued to 
report data (ref. 1). Net flux radiometers showed a sudden 
decrease in the net flux toward zero and a nearly discon- 
tinuous increase in atmospheric temperature (ref. 2). Box 
cover status signals, on boxes from which the temperature 
sensor and net flux radiometer had been deployed on the 
small probes, indicated the sensors had, impossibly, been 
restowed. Large probe thermocouple wires, which had 
been cut prior to jettisoning of the heat shield at parachute 
deployment, indicated signals of a few millivolts. These 
observations were not consistent with known variations in 
the atmospheric parameters, but must have represented 
difficulties in the proper operation of the external 
instrumentation. 
In the year after encounter, limited investigations of 
possible hardware causes of these anomalies were 
conducted at Hughes Aircraft Company, the probe 
contractor. No cause for the anomalies was identified. 
The project office sponsored a theoretical study at 
San Jose State University, which focused on sulfuric acid 
corrosion of the platinum temperature sensors (ref. 3). 
The predictions of this study were not entirely consistent 
with the observations and did not explain other occur- 
rences, including the simultaneous fall to zero of the 
measured net flux. Over the years, no further concerted 
attention was given to explain what happened. 
Now, missions to return to Venus are under consideration 
as candidate missions in the Discovery program. This 
gives renewed importance to understanding what caused 
the 12.5 km anomalies, because not understanding them 
may raise the possibility that they could reoccur. 
The Anomaly Workshop was convened at Ames Research 
Center to attempt to resolve what caused the anomalies. 
The workshop brought together probe system engineers 
from Hughes Aircraft Company; project office personnel 
(some now retired); probe scientists; instrument designers 
of the affected instruments; and other atmospheric 
scientists including chemists, dynamicists, and 
electrodynamicists. Participants were: 
Craig Baker 
William Borucki 
John Buterbaugh 
Ben Clark 
Roger Craig 
B. P. Dagarin 
Jack Dyer 
Bruce Fegley 
Richard Fimmel 
Peter Garriga 
John Givens 
Terry Grant 
Scott Hubbard 
Yo Inouye 
David Juergens 
Tony Knight 
John Krehbiel 
Uldis Lapins 
Larry Lasher 
John Mihalov 
C. M. Meredith 
Marc Murbach 
Leo Nolte 
William Pitts 
Louis Polaski 
Boris Ragent 
David Rider 
Victor Rogers 
Robert Ryan 
Alvin Seiff 
(convener) 
Simon Sommer 
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James Willet 
Richard E. Young 
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The agenda included: (1) a critical review of the 
anomalies of both the experiments and the spacecraft; 
(2) presentation and evaluation of candidate hardware 
explanations; (3) presentation and evaluation of candidate 
atmospheric phenomena as explanations. Subpanel 
meetings and workshop discussions were used to arrive 
at conclusions and recommendations. 
In this report, a background is given to explain how the 
probes were configured and to describe the nature of the 
anomalies. A summary of presentations made in the 
meeting and the accompanying outside analysis are 
included. Finally, the conclusions and recommendations 
are presented. 
The viewpoint taken is suddenly historical. That is, the 
ideas are reviewed as they happened, and explanations 
since disproved are described to indicate the sequence 
of arguments through which the problem became 
better understood. 
Thanks are due to all participants who contributed major 
written input to the proceedings. Particular thanks are 
due to Louis Polaski for his early efforts to catalog and 
describe the apparent anomalies; to the current and former 
Hughes Aircraft Company personnel who attended the 
workshop and contributed their invaluable memories and 
interpretations; and to Scott Hubbard and Lawrence 
Lasher who gave invaluable assistance in organizing 
and making the workshop possible. 
Background and List of the Anomalies 
The Pioneer Venus small and large probe configurations 
are shown in figure 1. A small probe is shown in 
exploded view in figure 1 (a), with the pressure vessel 
separated from the heat shield and the atmospheric 
temperature sensor and the net flux radiometer deployed 
from the sensor boxes mounted on the back sides of the 
pressure vessels. In descent to Venus, the heat shields 
were retained and the probes were in free fall (i.e., they 
did not deploy parachutes). In contrast, the large probe 
deployed a parachute and jettisoned its heat shield at the 
cloud tops. The parachute was released at 44 km so that in 
the deep atmosphere, the configuration was as shown in 
figure l(b). The temperature sensor, the mass spectrom- 
eter and pressure inlets, and the windows and optics used 
by the cloud particle spectrometer and two radiometers 
were exposed to the atmosphere when the aeroshell was 
jettisoned. Thus, the small and large probes at and 
below 12 km differed in both configuration and external 
materials. The large probe was just the titanium pressure 
vessel with a spherical windshield of sheet titanium, 
called the “aerofaring.” The small probe titanium 
pressure vessels were nested behind the retained 
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blunt-nosed, conical, carbon phenolic heat shields. 
Within the spherical titanium pressure vessels, there 
was a benign, low-temperature-pressure environment 
for all components not required to be in contact with 
the atmosphere. 
A list of the anomalies below 12.5 km as summarized by 
Fimmel et al. (ref. 4) is given in table 1. Because of 
design and instrument payload differences, many of the 
small probe anomalies were not applicable to the large 
probe and vice versa. Table 2 is a condensation of a 
similar list given by Polaski (ref. 5 )  and presented at the 
workshop to emphasize that probable causes exist for 
the first four anomalies. These were considered by the 
presenter (A. Seiff) to be well enough documented that 
they could be regarded as explained. The primary 
unexplained observations were items 5 through 11 in 
table 2. While the two science instrument anomalies are 
of principal interest, a number of lesser, but puzzling, 
unexplained events are noted in these tables. It is 
noteworthy that sensors inside the probes, including the 
optical radiation and cloud detection sensors and the mass 
spectrometer, continued to give valid data below 12.5 km 
to touchdown. 
These anomalies were discussed in greater detail by 
individuals having greatest familiarity with the data and 
hardware components. 
Net Flux Radiometer Anomalies (Summary of 
presentation by L. Sromovsky) 
Between 1800 and 2000 sec from entry, the indicated net 
fluxes from the three small probes (fig. 2, open circles) 
became anomalous, falling essentially to zero within a 
few sample intervals. Simultaneously, the net flux 
radiometer (NFR) temperatures (filled circles) departed 
from their prior rate of increase and either rose steeply to 
apparent saturation levels or, in the case of the night 
probe, first plunged to an indicated 350 K and then rose 
to saturation. The timing of these events differed by no 
more than 100 sec from anomalies experienced by the 
atmosphere structure instrument temperature sensors. 
Calibration signals from the NFR electronics were stable 
through the anomalous data period, indicating that the 
anomalies were not caused by an electronics failure. 
The last valid NFR temperature readings from small 
probes 1,2, and 3 were 63 1, 633, and 635 K, respectively. 
These are within 2-9 K of the temperatures at which the 
atmosphere structure instrument (ASI) breakdowns 
occurred. The net flux data and the temperature data 
became anomalous nearly simultaneously. The tempera- 
tures went from normal to anomalous in -96 sec (3 data 
samples). The net flux signals, normally approximately 
tenths of a millivolt, dropped to near 0 mv, suggestive of 
shorting of the signal leads. 
Unlike the AS1 temperatures, the NFR-indicated 
temperatures generally increased as a result of the 
anomaly (ref. 6). This would suggest increased resistance 
of the sensing element or, possibly, resistive contact of 
the signal leads with an outside voltage source, such as 
the heater power supply voltage (on a lead within the 
same cable). 
During sensor development, the NFR sensor heads, 
excluding the Hughes harness, were tested at elevated 
temperatures. Insulation resistances between sensor leads 
and sensor ground typically dropped from >lo* ohms at 
room temperature to as low as 3 x lo5 ohms at 684 K. 
Other insulation resistances were similarly reduced by 
elevated temperatures. These values were considered 
satisfactory for accurate readings. Some tests were 
performed in C02 at atmospheric pressure at tempera- 
tures up to 773 K. Others were performed at pressures up 
to 90 bars at high temperatures in a nitrogen environment. 
But the sensors were never tested at conditions that fully 
simulated Venus at and below 12.5 km (Le., in C02 at 
temperatures of 640 K or higher and at pressures of 
40 bars or higher). 
Atmosphere Structure Instrument Anomalies 
(Summary of presentation by A. S e w  
The AS1 temperature (T) sensor “breakdowns” are 
illustrated in figure 3 for the large and north probes. The 
drop in indicated temperatures near 2200 and 1950 sec 
from start of descent is nearly discontinuous. The drop- 
offs occur in approximately 1 sample interval, which is 
2 sec for the large probe and 16 sec for the north probe. 
Data from two independent sensors, T 1 and T2, were 
both affected. The latter was electrically insulated from 
the atmosphere. 
Conditions at the AS1 T sensor breakdowns were 
substantially the same on the four probes (table 3). 
Atmospheric temperatures were between 627 K and 
640 K (lowest for the large probe) and pressures were 
between 36 and 40 bars. 
The temperature sensors were platinum resistance 
thermometers with room temperature resistances of 
-10 and 14 ohms. Sensor resistances were measured 
precisely during descent by a 4-wire ohmmeter circuit to 
define their temperatures. Ti was a 100 micron platinum 
wire, wrapped around an insulated platinum-rhodium 
frame and open to the atmosphere. T2 was a 25 micron 
wire raster mounted on the same frame over a glass film 
on the windward side of the outermost platinum tube and 
covered by a thin insulating glass film. As shown for the 
3 
north probe in figure 3, the two independent sensing 
channels, Ti  and T2, broke down simultaneously. After 
reaching a minimum reading, reported temperatures 
partially recovered to values -0.7 to 0.9 those expected. 
In calibration to a maximum temperature of 643 K, the 
sensors functioned normally. The complete large probe 
descent configuration was tested in a simulation of 
expected temperatures as a function of time up to a 
maximum of 725 K in September 1977 prior to the probe 
final design review. This test was at atmospheric pressure 
in air. Instruments were operating during the test, and the 
temperature sensor functioned normally. A maximum 
temperature of 725 K was registered by T 1, and the two 
sensor channels agreed within a few degrees. Pressure 
vessels were qualified structurally in separate tests. By 
project and probe contractor decision, tests simulta- 
neously simulating the pressures and temperatures of 
the Venus deep atmosphere were not performed. There 
was no equipment to reproduce Venus surface conditions 
for the complete probes or temperature sensors. The 
development of such test facilities was recognized to be a 
costly undertaking because of safety problems associated 
with a large chamber heated to 500°C at 1500 psi internal 
pressure. This test would have impacted the schedule and 
cost on a program run in much the same spirit as the 
present Discovery program. 
The sensor breakdown at 12.5 km was similar in some 
respects to the shorting of T 1 in the sulfuric acid clouds 
above 50 km (fig. 3(a)). In both cases, the T1 readings 
dropped well below ambient atmospheric temperature; 
at 12.5 km the onset was more precipitous and the T2 
element, though insulated from the atmosphere, was 
affected as was the exposed element, T i .  This similarity 
suggested the possibility that the sensor elements were 
partially shorted in the deep atmosphere. 
The Ti sensor behavior in the clouds was a result of 
diversion of some of the excitation current around the 
sensing element by a short, created by a conductive film 
or droplets of sulfuric acid on the free wires and the 
sensor frame. In the period of anomaly, the observed data 
behavior can likewise be explained by shorting or the 
diversion of excitation current in both sensor channels. 
The shorting could have occurred: (1) within the sensors; 
(2) in the harness wires, particularly those external to the 
probes and subjected to the atmospheric environment; or 
(3) by a deposit of conductive material from the atmo- 
sphere. This possibility will be further discussed in a later 
section. A resistance -lo00 ohms from the excitation 
current leads to probe ground would produce the observed 
effect on the data. 
Sensor internal insulation resistances were normally in 
the range of lo6 to 10 lo ohms. Insulation resistance was 
adversely affected in moist environments, going to values 
as low as 50,000 ohms. Values greater than lo6 ohms 
were recovered when the sensors were dried in vacuum. 
After the final calibration of the Venus sensors at Ames in 
April 1977, the sensors were dried in vacuum at -4OOC 
for -60 hours. Test data taken in Florida prior to launch 
gave correct temperatures. The long exposure to the 
vacuum of space during cruise, and the hot, dry Venus 
atmosphere during descent would further contribute to 
high sensor insulation resistance. 
A second kind of anomaly in the AS1 data listed by 
Polaski and Fimmel (refs. 4 and 5) was a series of 
unexpected jumps in pressure sensor offsets. The jumps 
occurred at atmospheric pressures less than -20 bars, 
i.e., at altitudes above 20 km (ref. 7), and were caused 
by the bursting of low-range sensor diaphragms at high 
overpressures. The sensors were inside the probe pressure 
vessels. They sensed pitot pressures conducted by a 
manifold open to the outside atmosphere. The offset 
jumps were a result of current leakage in the solid state 
switches that selected the on-range sensors and are 
considered to be satisfactorily explained. 
Nephelometer Observations in the Anomaly Period 
(Summary of presentation by B. Ragent) 
The third instrument on each small probe was a 
nephelometer that was used to sense the presence of 
particulate matter in the atmosphere. This instrument also 
incorporated radiometers to sense ambient radiation at 
365 and 530 nm. The large probe also carried a neph- 
elometer. The instruments were inside the pressure vessel. 
The nephelometers viewed the outside atmosphere 
through side-view windows located on the afterbodies 
of the small probes, figure l(a), which were not directly 
exposed to atmospheric flow. The nephelometer data 
below 12.5 km were normal and appear valid. 
An unexpected observation in the nephelometer data was 
the detecGon of small backscatter signals in a layer about 
0.25 km deep near 6 km altitude by the two nightside 
probes (ref. 8), indicating the presence of a particle- 
bearing layer. These signals have not received much 
attention, nor have they been explained. A second 
observation was the detection of UV and IR radiation 
below 15 km by the background radiation detectors in the 
two dayside probes. The intensity increased with depth. 
This radiation was explained as atmospheric thermal 
emission leaking through the detector filters. No unusual 
variations in light signals were seen, which could be due 
to chemical reactions (e.g., burning) in the near vicinity of 
the probes. 
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Other Probe Anomalies 
Other probe anomalies listed in table 2 include thermo- 
couple and cold junction temperature anomalies, a sizable 
decrease in the large probe bus current at 11.5 km, a 
“booms-restowed” indication from all six small probe 
deployment mechanisms, small step changes in communi - 
cation system parameters, and changes in large probe 
internal temperature and pressure. 
These observations help reveal the nature of the 
phenomena causing the anomalies. 
1. The booms-restowed indication was received on the 
three small probes at the next switch status reading after 
AS1 temperature sensor breakdown (within 64-224 sec). 
This anomaly was previously explained as a result of 
shorting of the switch contacts by collapse of the micro- 
switch case at high pressure and temperature (ref. 9). 
Two alternative explanations were discussed, but dis- 
missed: (1) breakdown of harness insulation resistance to 
-2500 ohms, at which time the electronics would indicate 
that the switch was closed; and (2) electrostatic damage to 
the multiplexer chip, which routes the status signal to the 
command and data unit (CDU) (ref. 10). This explanation 
was somewhat discredited by Buterbaugh (ref. 10) 
because the CDU was also susceptible to static damage 
and survived the anomaly period. 
The boom-status switch was provided to verify that the 
AS1 and NFR booms were deployed at the sfurf of 
descent (Le., above 60 km altitude); survival to the 
surface was not required. Two post-encounter tests of the 
switch in a programmed simulation of increasing pressure 
and temperature in descent were described in a Hughes 
interdepartmental memo (ref. 11). The tests were consis- 
tent in showing switch failure at a pressure of 60 bars at 
temperatures of 486 K in the first and 716 K in the second 
test. This is the pressure at 6.5 km altitude on Venus- 
an altitude reached 6-8 min later in the descent than the 
booms-restowed signals were transmitted. An unresolved 
question’in the second test was whether the failure was 
caused by pressure or by temperature degradation of the 
potting compound. If the failure was caused by the latter, 
failure pressures greater than 60 bars would be indicated. 
Hence, switch failure by collapse at 40 bars (12.5 km) is 
not consistent with the test data, and other possibilities for 
the‘change in switch state, including harness shorting, 
remain viable. 
2. 
signals behaved anomalously shortly after the AS1 T 
sensor breakdowns (ref. 5). The thennistors defined cold- 
junction temperatures for the thermocouples embedded in 
the heat shield. They were located on a terminal board 
mounted on stand-off posts on the back face of the 
The three small probe cold-junction thermistor 
aeroshell in a space vented to the atmosphere. Gas flowed 
into this space to maintain atmospheric pressure as the 
probes descended. At the time of AS1 T sensor break- 
down, all of these thermistors were reading full-scale 
temperatures (505 K). Within 4.5 min, however, readings 
dropped to incredibly low values (e.g., a minimum of 
194 K on small probe (SP) l) ,  but recovered to full scale 
again over an additional 6 min. In an interdepartmental 
memo to C. M. Meredith (ref. lo), J. N. Buterbaugh 
concluded that the most likely cause was “insulation 
failure or contamination of the connector pins associated 
with their harness.” The degraded insulation resistance 
to reproduce the minimum indicated temperature is 
2650 ohms, a value similar to that required to explain the 
boom microswitch failure and the AS1 T sensor break- 
downs. Buterbaugh also discussed electrostatic damage to 
the electronics as a possible cause, but concluded that it 
was not a tenable explanation. 
If partial shorting is the explanation for the drop in 
thermistor temperatures, the recovery of the indicated 
temperatures to full-scale values would require either that 
the short resistance increase with time to -8000 ohms or 
that a resistive connection to a power lead within the 
cable develop, a mechanism proposed by Buterbaugh to 
explain the large probe thermocouple anomaly and by 
Sromovsky to explain the NFR temperature anomaly. 
3. There were two thermocouples in the large probe 
heat shield to monitor its performance, one near the 
stagnation point and one near the conical base. Leads 
from these thermocouples were severed before the heat 
shield was jettisoned at the start of descent (above 
66 km). The cut ends were retained within the cable cutter 
housing on the descent module. Starting at about 15 km 
altitude, signals of 1 count or 0.2 mv appeared in both 
sets of leads, increasing for one sample to 2 counts, 
then holding steady on the stagnation point sensor but 
returning to 0 on the sensor located near the conical base. 
Near 8 km altitude, the stagnation point sensor registered 
a series of 1 count increments in signal at 2-3 min 
intervals, accumulating a total of 6 counts or 1.2 mv. 
The other sensor accumulated 2 counts or 0.4 mv. 
It has been proposed that these signals might have been 
induced by interaction of the cut wires with a plasma of 
unidentified origin around the Probe. However, the wire 
ends were isolated from an external plasma by being 
enclosed in the cable cutter. A second explanation 
(ref. 10) is that the cut ends came into resistive contact 
with other wires within the anvil carrying 28 volts, which 
were also part of the cable severed by the cutter. At the 
preflight final design review in June 1976, this possibility 
was somewhat anticipated by notes on page 8 1 of the 
System Interfaces presentation (ref. 12): “Large Probe 
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Cable Cutter Could Cause Conductive Shorts” and below 
that, “Present Design Offers Ample Protection Against 
Shorts.” Although it cannot be confirmed, this seems to 
be a completely adequate explanation for the observed 
signals. Changes in signal with altitude could result if the 
wires moved because of thermal expansion as the system 
was heated by the atmosphere. 
4. A large step decrease in large probe bus current 
(2.12 amps) occurred at 11.5 km altitude. This current 
step corresponds to the second stage window heater 
current provided to keep the window of the infrared 
radiometer instrument clear of condensates, and implies 
that the heater either burned out or shorted to its housing, 
which would have burned out the fuse. The nichrome 
heater was insulated from its tantalum tube housing by a 
minimal, 0.006-in. layer of magnesium oxide. A number 
of problems leading to both shorts and open circuits in the 
heater had been experienced during development (refs. 13 
and 14), and it is quite conceivable that the heater failed 
in descent under the stresses imposed by the lower 
atmosphere temperature and pressure environment. Given 
these circumstances, this should not be considered an 
unexplainable anomaly. 
5. 
pressure could not be found in a current review of the 
data. Internal pressure progressed in resolution-limited 
steps of 0.21 psi to increase smoothly from 19.0 psia at 
the start of descent to 27.27 psia at touchdown. Similarly, 
the internal temperature increased in discrete steps of 
0.8”C (forward shelf) and 1.14”C (aft shelf) correspond- 
ing to the measurement resolution. The temperature 
envelope increased smoothly and continuously. There 
was no anomaly requiring explanation. 
6. Anomalies listed by Polaski (ref. 5 )  in the large probe 
radio communications system were analyzed by N. Wong 
(ref. 15) and for the workshop by Peter Garriga of 
Hughes, who reported that there were 1 count steps in 
the automatic gain control (AGC) and in the static phase 
error of the transmitter at 39 min after entry (approximate 
altitude 9 km). The static phase error has a temperature 
sensitivity of 1 c0unt/6~C, which could account for its 
one-step shift. Doppler tracking of the probes required 
receiving signals from Earth and retransmitting them. 
Probe dynamics (ref. 16) coupled with ripples in the 
antenna pattern could account for one-step changes in the 
AGC. Conclusion: Nothing outside the limits of normal 
operation occurred. 
In summary, of the listed probe anomalies, several are 
within limits of normal operation or have logical and 
credible explanations. Only the booms-restowed indica- 
tion and the thermistor behavior cannot be accounted for 
with assurance, but there are quite believable explanations 
The anomalous steps reported in large probe internal 
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for these two as well. The consistent theme that explains 
these and AS1 and NFR anomalies is that all would be 
accounted for by degradation in harness insulation to 
-1d ohms. However, this has not been demonstrated 
beyond reasonable doubt, nor has it been refuted by 
definitive tests. 
Harness Studies 
Immediately after probe encounter in December 1978, 
the possibility was raised that insulation breakdown in 
the probe external harness at the high pressure and 
temperature on Venus at 12 km could have caused the 
anomalous behavior of the external instruments (ref. 17). 
This prompted a reexamination of the harness testing 
conducted prior to flight and to additional tests. 
Preflight tests of the two external cable types were 
performed in May-June 1976. Tests were in nitrogen at 
temperatures up to 760 K and pressures up to 100 bars. 
Insulation resistance 2106 ohms was recorded at 645 K. 
Because of practical difficulties of achieving the desired 
pressure and temperature from bottled C02, it was not 
used in these tests. Both C02 and N2 were considered 
to be chemically inert, so the substitution of N2 was 
considered satisfactory. 
Kynar shrink tubing was used to cover the single-pin 
Cryocon connectors used to connect both the AS1 and 
NFR sensors to the harness. Tests showed that Kynar 
“degraded to ash” at T I 7 5 0  K in 1 atm of N2, but this 
was said not to impair insulation resistance (ref. 18). 
The effects of the sulfuric acid in the clouds of Venus on 
kapton, the polyimide film used to wrap the external 
harness, were not simulated in preflight testing. After 
the probes encountered Venus, Hughes Space and 
Communications Company consulted DuPont Chemical 
Corporation, the manufacturer of kapton, about sulfuric 
acid effects and were told that kapton is embrittled by 
long-term exposure to sulfuric acid (ref. 18). In February 
1979, three months after the encounter, Hughes tested 
harness specimens with sulfuric acid exposure. The test 
cable was coated with 96 percent acid applied as droplets 
from a pipette and cotton swabs were used to distribute it. 
The cable was then quickly tested (within 9 min), and 
subjected to a programmed increase of pressure and 
temperature using N2 as the test gas. Insulation resistance 
measured during the test remained at >lo6 ohms after 
35 min (simulating the time at 12.5 km), but dropped to 
1.5 x lo5 ohms after 60 min when pressure was 760 K 
and 100 bars. After the test, inspection showed the outer 
kapton layer to be essentially “removed by the acid” 
(refs. 9 and 19). 
The substitution of N2 for C 0 2  may not be benign, as 
assumed, because equilibrium chemical calculations show 
that C02 at 40 bars and 640 K is, for some substances, an 
oxidizing agent. It oxidizes titanium, yielding Ti02 and 
CO. Kapton, a long chain organic polymer with an 
abundance of oxidizable H atoms appended to a central 
carbon chain, may also oxidize in C02.  That is, kapton 
may “burn” in CO2 at high pressure and temperature. 
Post-Encounter Studies by Goodman and Albert 
Goodman and Albert (ref. 3) examined possible 
explanations for the AS1 temperature sensor breakdown, 
but not the more general problem of explaining all 
observed anomalies. They considered and evaluated 
five mechanisms for atmospheric electrification. One 
mechanism was localized chemical gradients giving rise 
to local electrical discharges, with the gradients being 
generated by decomposition products diffusing from the 
carbon phenolic heat shield at 570-620 K. Citing a 
Hughes report, they state that between 2 and 10 g/min 
of gases will be evolved. However, they reach the 
conclusion, “It is evident that malfunction of the probe 
was caused by a phenomenon other than a direct electrical 
discharge.” (See section by Borucki for further comment 
on this possibility.) 
They performed a study of collection efficiencies for 
H2SO4 cloud particles of the complete probe and of the 
Ti wires. The efficiency for the probes was 0, but was 
0.93 for the wires (the mass of acid collected by the wires 
in vertical transit through the clouds was calculated to be 
0.14 mg/cm of wire length). They argued that the acid 
would wet and evenly coat the wires with a film. 
Goodman and Albert considered evaporation of the 
collected acid below the clouds, and, because water 
evaporates preferentially, found that the acid would 
concentrate. Starting with 80 percent acid, the concen- 
tration reaches 90 percent to 100 percent at altitudes of 
25-40 km. (Note: The AS1 data showed that acid was 
cleared from the free wires earlier than this (i.e., shortly 
after large probe parachute jettison). This was explained 
by Seiff et al. (ref. 7) as removal by the mechanical action 
of the wind, i.e., by shear and pressure forces.) 
Scanning the range of possible further reactions, 
Goodman and Albert considered metallic chlorides that 
could adhere to and dissolve in the acid film. The concen- 
trated acid would, they stated, adsorb any H 2s present 
and reduce it to sulfur. These dissolved materials would 
possibly embrittle the platinum wire. They cited a refer- 
ence that stated the platinum was slowly attacked by 
hot, concentrated sulfuric acid and formed hydrated 
Pt(S04)3 - n(H20). The concentrated chemical film 
could, they speculate, “cause the thin glass insulating 
layers to crack or rupture and short out the temperature 
sensor,” referring to the bonded sensor T2 (stated 
without proof). 
Goodman and Albert also discussed the reactivity of 
tantalum (used in the large probe infrared radiometer 
(LR) window heater) with sulfuric acid and concluded 
that it is unlikely to have caused failure because sulfuric 
acid at 300°C reacts with tantalum at the rate of 
342 mils/year. 
The conclusion was: “Failure most probably occurred 
on the basic platinum resistance thermometer due to 
sulfuric acid collection on the platinum wire. Ground 
tests should be conducted on a similar sensor in a 
synthetic Venusian atmospheric descent from the cloud 
region to the failure altitude. The synthetic atmosphere 
should contain the major trace components of the clouds 
and the gaseous atmosphere.” This conclusion does not 
explain the observed anomalies of the NFR and the other 
probe anomalies. 
The Soviet Venera Probes: Differences from 
Pioneer Venus 
Reports in the Soviet literature on the Venera probe 
missions do not address or discuss anomalies at the 12 km 
level. Soviet Venera and Vega Lander scientists, Victor 
Kerzhanovich and Vyacheslav Linkin, were asked if any 
anomalous behavior occurred at 12 km and they replied 
there was none (Seiff report to workshop). 
A photograph and a drawing of the common configura- 
tion of the Venera and Vega Landers are shown in 
figure 4. Although the drawing is not very clear, there 
were many external instruments on the Venera probes 
shown in fig. 4(b), and titanium was used liberally. The 
central pressure vessel is an 82 cm diameter titanium 
sphere. It is encased in 1 1-cm thick exterior insulation 
(called KSBI), which apparently is a frangible material 
because it was enclosed within a retaining shell of thin 
titanium. Ahead of the pressure vessel is a toroidal ring 
(the bottom half is also apparently made of sheet 
titanium) to absorb the landing shock at a touchdown 
velocity of 8 m/sec. This is supported from the pressure 
vessel on -16 tubular struts made of asbestos textolite 
(believed to be an asbestos-fiber-reinforced polymer). 
This is the same material used as a heat shield with 
maximum thickness 2.65 cm on the 2.4 m diameter outer 
sphere that encloses the Lander during hypersonic entry. 
Numerous external instruments and equipment are 
attached to the landing ring and its struts. It is not clear 
whether there were exposed wires or harness outside the 
pressure vessel, or whether these were protected within 
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conduit, for example. Above the pressure vessel is a large 
drag ring to slow the descent of the capsule, and, above 
this, the parachute compartment and telemetry antenna. 
Two key instruments, the gas chromatograph and mass 
spectrometer are mounted outside the pressure vessel 
below the parachute canister. There are also four thin 
titanium blades (not identified in the picture) to damp 
rotational motion. No information is available on the 
nature of the insulation in the exterior electrical harness. 
The Venera Landers have reported measurements down 
to the planet surface from the external sensors, including 
temperature sensors. Therefore, it appears that the Pioneer 
Venus anomalies are attributable to or associated with 
particular design features of the Probes or instruments. 
Possible Atmospheric Effects 
Over the years since encounter, a few atmospheric 
mechanisms have been suggested as possibly responsible 
for the anomalies, including electrostatic charging of the 
descending probes and subsequent discharges to the 
atmosphere. Chemical reactions of probe materials 
(notably titanium) with the atmosphere have also been 
discussed. Workshop science participants were invited to 
study these (and other) possibilities and to report their 
ideas and findings. Included are brief summaries of the 
phenomena proposed and investigated. More complete 
reports of these studies are published in volume 2. 
Electrostatic Effects (W. Borucki) 
The charging of aerosols in the atmosphere of Venus 
calculated by Borucki et al. (ref. 20). Their calculations 
showed each of the three observed particle size distri - 
butions (ref. 21) to be charged. Although this model is not 
confirmed by observations, if these particles are indeed 
charged, the probes would have become charged by 
interactions with the particles, just as aircraft often 
experience charging currents of 250 microamps and, if 
unprotected by discharge wicks, become charged to 
would then retain the charge until it leaked away or until 
a situation arose that would trigger spark discharges. The 
interplay between the size distributions make it difficult 
to predict the polarity and magnitude of the charge that 
would be left on the spacecraft as it exited from the 
bottom of the aerosol layer that extends below the cloud 
bottoms to 30 km altitude. 
The electric field around the probe cannot exceed the 
dielectric strength of the atmosphere. At 30 km altitude, 
the dielectric strength of the atmosphere is approximately 
l and the electrical conductivity of the atmosphere were 
, voltages in excess of 500,000 volts (ref. 22). The probes 
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300 kV/cm. For a 0.75 m diameter sphere, up to 
250 joules of electrical energy stored on the probe would 
produce such a field. Because of the booms protruding 
from the spacecraft, it is likely that the stored energy to 
create a discharge is much lower. The actual energy 
stored depends on the detailed interactions of the probes 
with the cloud particles. 
Once the entry probes descend below the bottom of the 
aerosol layer at 30 km, no new charge is collected and 
ions produced by galactic cosmic rays begin to neutralize 
the charge that was collected with a time constant 
inversely proportion to the conductivity of the atmo - 
sphere. Based on the conductivity curve for the Venusian 
atmosphere given by Borucki et al. (ref. 20), the relaxa- 
tion time is somewhat greater than 15 min at an altitude 
of 30 km and increases rapidly with pressure, reaching a 
value of 2.7 hr at 12 km. Because the probes descend to 
the 12 km level in about 25 min, only a fraction of the 
charge present at 30 km can leak away during the descent. 
As the probes descend, increasing pressure might be 
expected to increase the dielectric strength of the gas and 
make spark discharges more difficult. However, the 
dependence of dielectric strength on density is seldom 
linear above a few bars for most gases, and typically there 
exists a critical pressure where dielectric strength falls 
precipitously for nonuniform fields (refs. 23 and 24). For 
air, the critical pressure at 286 K is 10 bars; at 373 K, it is 
21 bars. Consequently it is possible that the entry probes 
became charged during their passage through the clouds 
and haze and did not have time to be fully neutralized by 
ions in the atmosphere before they descended to the 
critical pressure, where spark breakdown occurred. The 
highest electric fields occur on the sharpest protrusions 
from the spacecraft and it is at these protrusions that 
sparking is most likely. Because the temperature and net 
flux radiometer sensors are small diameter projections, 
they are the most likely locations for electrical discharges. 
It is possible that electrical sparks not only damaged the 
instrumentation directly, but could also have ignited local 
fires that then damaged the instrument wires, the wire 
insulation, or the cables that carried the signals and the 
power. Energetic electrical discharges are a well known 
source of fires, and if materials flammable in C02 are 
nearby, they could have been set afire. That the Soviet 
probes did not experience anomalous behavior at 12.5 km 
from this or other mechanisms could be explained by the 
absence of flammable or vulnerable components near 
discharge sites. 
Relevant to chemical reactions, Gaydon and Wolfhard 
(ref. 25) state that ". . . it is interesting to note that 
zirconium, magnesium, and titanium are easily ignited in 
pure Co;? ." Although it is known that many metals bum 
in C02 at room temperature and pressure, very little 
data is available for what happens at the much higher 
temperatures and pressures (650 K and 47 bars) 
experienced by the probes near 10 km altitude (ref. 7). 
However, for the flames commonly studied in the labora- 
tory, it is found that temperatures rise with increasing 
pressure and the flammability limits become wider 
(ignition becomes easier). 
These observations lead to the following scenario: (1) The 
probes acquire charge during passage through the clouds. 
(2) As they emerge and descend belbw the clouds and 
aerosol layer, the charge tends to be neutralized by 
atmospheric ions, but with a time constant longer than the 
descent time, leaving the probes appreciably charged at 
12 km. (3) At 12 km, the atmosphere attains the critical 
pressure and temperature at which the breakdown 
potential drops precipitously. (4) Energetic sparks occur 
at the external sensors and wiring. (5 )  The sparks ignite 
fires on the probe materials that are flammable in C02, 
which include titanium. 
Conductive Condensates in the Deep Atmosphere 
(A. S e w  
The similarity of the AS1 temperature anomaly to the Ti 
shorting response in the clouds suggests the possibility 
that a conductive material, perhaps a metal, condensed on 
the sensor in the deep atmosphere. Because both T2 and 
T1 were affected, something was different about the 
presumed deep atmosphere condensate compared to the 
cloud condensate (sulfuric acid). Perhaps the difference 
was a greater mass deposited, leading to a longer con - 
ducting path from an exposed T2 lead juncture to the 
uncoated region of the frame. 
There are two independent observations that bear on 
this possibility of a conductive condensate. One is the 
observation by the Magellan microwave radiometer of 
sharply lower radar emissivity and increased conductivity 
of the planet surface at elevations above 5 km. This 
change was discussed by Pettingill et al. (ref. 26) and is 
illustrated in figure 5 (ref. 27). The high-altitude regions 
are highly radar reflective, as is typical of conductors. 
At these levels, surface condensation or deposition of a 
substance with high conductivity would produce this 
effect. There is no proven explanation for the observed 
anomalous reflectivity, but it is consistent with a con- 
stituent vaporized from the surface that condenses on the 
mountain tops (and the probe). 
The second independent observation is that no aerosols 
were seen at these levels by the nephelometer, except at 
6 km on the nightside (ref. 8). It is difficult to imagine a 
condensate that does not form aerosols, but condenses on 
a large object (the probe) only slightly cooler than the 
atmosphere. This could imply a very small population of 
nuclei on which aerosols could form. Thus, if conden- 
sation occurs, it is only on the mountain tops and the 
probe surface. 
Atmospheric temperature data indicate that the layer 
between 13-20 km is stable (ref. 7). Large probe descent 
velocities (derived from the pressure data) show oscilla- 
tions with altitude in this layer, implying the presence of 
waves and consistent with the finding of stability from 
temperature data. In the lowest 6 km, the atmosphere 
was found, in data acquired by Vyacheslav Linkin and 
colleagues with the Soviet Vega 2 Lander (ref. 28), 
to be unstable and therefore convective. Under these 
conditions, species vaporized from the surface are 
convected and mixed upward to the level of the stable 
layer where the upflow is capped, trapping the convected 
species. Is there a connection between this and the 
probe anomalies? 
Lewis (ref. 29) expected mercury to be vaporized at 
surface temperature and transported upward to form 
clouds, but none was seen by the Pioneer Venus probes. 
The large probe neutral mass spectrometer did not find 
mercury, but placed an upper limit of 5 ppm on its mole 
fraction. In a private communication, Thomas Donahue 
remarked to the first author that mercury vapor could pass 
through the inlet and condense on the cold instrument 
walls and go undetected (ref. 30). 
In sufficient concentration, mercury vapor would 
condense on the probe and the exposed sensors below 
13 km and short the free-wire Ti  sensor to the frame. It 
would not short the T2 sensor unless the sensing element- 
lead junctures were exposed (a distinct possibility). And 
it would not easily explain the IWR temperature sensor 
anomaly because this sensor wire was insulated and 
behind a titanium shield. But fine mercury droplets 
coating the NFR window would reflect and block incident 
radiation, causing readings to fall abruptly, as observed. 
Hence, a conductive condensate could explain a number 
of the things observed. 
From the phase diagram, at a partial pressure of 1 atm, 
mercury condenses at 630 K. This partial pressure 
corresponds to a 0.025 mole fraction of mercury at the 
40 bar level, which is 50 times higher than Lewis’ 
suggested upper limit of 0.0005. At this lower concen- 
tration, mercury condensation would occur at an altitude 
of 32.5 km where no cloud was seen. The absence of a 
mercury cloud at 32.5 km could be a consequence of the 
mercury being trapped in the convective layer below 
13 km. But condensation on the mountain tops is 
prohibited by surface temperatures greater than the 
vaporization temperature at this partial pressure. 
-. 
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There are other candidate, conductive substances 
including potassium and cadmium. Potassium is liquid 
above 336.4 K, and has a vapor pressure of 1.7 mb at 
635 K, corresponding to a mole fraction of 45 ppm. It is 
not ruled out by mass spectrometer data because its 
isotope masses overlap those of argon, from which it 
would be indistinguishable. Cadmium is liquid above 
594 K, with a vapor pressure of -0.7 mb at 635 K, and a 
mole fraction -20 ppm in equilibrium with the liquid. 
Both cadmium and potassium are commonly present in 
Earth’s volcanic gases in combined forms (ref. 31). 
Condensation of a conductive species does not appear 
to be a likely cause of the probe anomalies. Contrary 
indications are: (1) lack of aerosols below 13 km;. 
(2) inadequate mercury abundance; (3) chemical 
reactivity of conducting species, discussed below; 
(4) involvement of the T2 sensor in the anomaly: and 
( 5 )  involvement of the NFR temperature sensor. 
Equilibrium Chemistry in the Deep Atmosphere 
(R. Craig) 
Equilibrium chemistry at and below 17 km was 
investigated to: (1) study the reactions of titanium with 
CO2 as an oxidizing agent, i.e., to explore the possibility 
of a burning probe, and (2) study the fate of possible 
conducting condensates in an atmosphere having the bulk 
and trace species composition of reference 32. 
The metals chosen for initial consideration were titanium, 
potassium, iron, and magnesium. Titantium was of 
interest because it was the material used to construct the 
large probe’s aerofaring and spin vanes, the pressure 
vessels of all four probes, and parts of the NFR. The latter 
three metals were found in surface composition measure- 
ments by Veneras 13 and 14 (ref. 33). It was assumed that 
the metals could be present in the atmosphere, introduced 
as dust or as volatile compounds (e.g., chlorides) or as 
vapors that could reach the top of the convective layer. 
The effects of introducing from 50 to lo00 ppm of these 
species on the equilibrium composition of the deep 
atmosphere were interesting and will be found in the 
elaboration of these results in volume 2. Here, only those 
results that bear on possible relationships to the anomalies 
are summarized. 
At equilibrium, the metal atoms were found to be entirely 
consumed in reactions and yielded solid products: Ti02; 
Fk304, FeS2, and FeS (depending on the initial iron 
concentration); K2S04, K2aO3, and KCl; and MgCO3. 
Metallic titanium would indeed bum in the deep atmo- 
sphere of Venus if it were not protected by an oxide 
layer on the surface (similar to the layer which protects 
aluminum against burning in Earth’s atmosphere). 
The calculations further indicate that gas phase metal 
atoms are not present in chemical equilibrium at 
13 km over Venus, but are replaced by the solid car- 
bonates, sulfates, chlorides, and oxides. The oxygen in 
these compounds is provided by C02 (the oxidizing 
agent), and the sulfur by the 150 ppm of SO2 in the 
atmospheric model. 
There is a marked influence of the metals on the other 
trace species. While the levels of H20  and hydrogen 
fluoride are relatively unaffected, the levels of SO2 
decrease and CO and H2 are increased in the presence of 
trace quantities of metals. Graphite occurs with titanium, 
as C 0 2  molecules are fully reduced to carbon. COS 
and H2S are increased with titanium, potassium, and 
magnesium, but decreased slightly with iron. The HCl 
concentration is unaffected with titanium, iron, and 
magnesium present; but, with potassium in the atmo- 
sphere, HCI is depleted and the chlorine compound at 
equilibrium is KCl. Trace amounts of CH4 occur with 
titanium, iron, and magnesium. Other species than those 
plotted were calculated, but were present at very minor 
concentrations (1 ppb or less). 
The metals have interesting effects on the chemistry of 
the other trace species, which could explain deviations 
of the composition from equilibrium composition 
calculated in the absence of metal atoms. See volume 2 
for further discussion. 
Report of the Engineering Panel 
(D. Juergens) 
The AS1 temperature data from external temperature 
sensors on all four probes failed at nearly the same time 
that data from other sensors located on the exterior of the 
spacecraft failed. The scientific data from internal sensors 
continued without anomaly throughout descent. The AS1 
pressure sensors and accelerometers provided turbulence 
data along with the pressure and atmospheric density 
profiles. The last reported exterior temperature of the 
atmosphere (-640 K all four probes) is nearly identical to 
the eutectic temperature of 60/40 Sn/Pb solder. However, 
the Hughes Aircraft Company engineers were positive 
that all exterior harness connectors were crimped and not 
soldered. The instrument temperatures inside all four 
probes were below 300 K at the time of failure. The proj- 
ect members and others have proposed that the failures 
may have been due to electrical interaction with the 
atmosphere. However, these external sensor failures have 
not been reported on any of the Soviet Venera missions. 
During the workshop, it was reported that the probes were 
never exposed to high-temperature system-level tests 
because of the cost of testing. A test of some sensors at 
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high pressures, but not high temperatures, was performed 
in a C02 and dry nitrogen environment. 
The engineering panel found that almost all of the 
reported anomalies could be explained by a breakdown 
of the external insulation, which reduced the resistance 
between conductors to kilohm levels. It is likely that the 
kapton insulation was chemically altered by some means 
(caught on fire), which resulted in a breakdown of the 
interwire impedance. 
Probes developed for future missions in the lower 
atmosphere of Venus should be tested in a simulated 
atmosphere of C02 at simultaneously high temperatures 
and high pressures simulating Venus surface conditions. 
A test of materials should be performed using the Pioneer 
Venus harness materials in C02'heated to 600-700 K at 
pressures of 30-50 bars to evaluate the cable insulation 
resistance and chemical tolerance of the harness to the 
Venus deep atmosphere environment. 
Recommended Laboratory Testing 
(L. Sromovsky) 
External cabling between sensor assemblies and the probe 
pressure vessels were provided by Hughes as part of the 
spacecraft. These cables consisted of bare leads covered 
with woven quartz or glass fiber sleeves (resin free) with 
individual leads wrapped in kapton. The leads were then 
lashed together to make complete cables. In some cases 
(e.g., the NFR net flux detector leads) pairs of kapton- 
wrapped leads were encased in a braided metal shield that 
was also wrapped in kapton before the leads were lashed 
together to make a complete cable assembly. Although 
kapton may be the best high-temperature polymer 
insulation, it is now known that kapton is not suitable for 
continuous operation at Venus surface temperatures. 
Unfortunately, kapton-wrapped cable bundles were not 
tested under descent conditions prior to their use on the 
Pioneer Venus probes. They were tested in a nitrogen 
atmosphere and showed some degraded insulation 
between leads, presumably due to degradation of the 
kapton wrap and subsequent invasion of the fiberglass 
sleeves with conductive material. There is reason to 
expect that kapton degradation might be accelerated in a 
CO2 atmosphere and perhaps at high pressures. Because 
the same type of cable construction was used on NFR 
and AS1 connecting cables, it is natural to wonder if the 
nearly simultaneous anomalies of these two very different 
instruments might both be a consequence of the same 
cable degradation. This possibility cannot be ruled out by 
tests that have been conducted so far. 
A new test to investigate the performance of the kapton - 
wrapped cables may unambiguously identify the origin of 
the Pioneer Venus anomalies. Such a test should include 
both shielded and unshielded cable elements, constructed 
in the same fashion as the flight cables, and possibly 
make use of spare flight cables if they are still available. 
The test should also include the bulkhead connector 
where connector pins might be exposed to material 
emitted by the degrading cable insulation. It may also be 
the case that the connector had a problem under descent 
conditions. It is not clear what testing was done on the 
bulkhead connector. In any case, it should be included as 
part of future tests. 
The test should first be conducted in a pure C02 
atmosphere, under the presumption that trace gases and 
sulfuric acid do not play a significant role. The amount of 
sulfuric acid that could be deposited on the cables as a 
result of cloud particle impact is extremely small; fixtures 
exposed to the direct gas stream outside the boundary 
layer would, on average, pick up only enough acid to 
make a layer approximately 10 pm thick (ref. 34). In the 
more protected locations of the external cabling, far less 
acid would be deposited. Furthermore, any acid deposited 
within the cloud layer would bk evaporating as the probe 
descended below the clouds (an example of this effect is 
probably seen in the AS1 Ti  sensors, which were 
temporarily perturbed in and just below the clouds, but 
returned to normal as temperatures increased). 
In such a test, the temperature and pressure should follow 
the approximate time history of the probe descent, 
although by far the most relevant part of the test is the 
simulation of the approach to the 635 K point. During 
actual descent the bulkhead connector temperature will 
lag behind that of the atmosphere, and the cable will 
probably be hotter at the sensor connector than at the 
bulkhead connector. This temperature gradient could be 
an important factor in simulating the effect of cable 
degradation. If the hot part of the cable is generating 
vapor products near 635 K, these might condense on the 
colder connector and deposit a conducting layer of 
material between connector pins. But if the connector 
temperature is allowed to be as high as the cable, the 
condensation may not occur. Thus the thermal gradients 
during descent should probably also be simulated in the 
ground test. 
Resistance between all leads and shields should be 
measured during the ground simulation of the 
descent conditions. 
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Addendum: Harness Tests Performed After 
the Workshop (A. Seiff) 
Subsequent to the workshop, the recommended harness 
tests were started at Hughes Aircraft Company under the 
direction of Victor Rogers. The tests will be more fully 
reported elsewhere. The tests performed and some of the 
key results are summarized here. 
The test facility was an existing 1-liter capacity chamber, 
7.5 cm in inside diameter and 23 cm long, which was 
large enough to hold small harness samples. The chamber 
is capable of duplicating Venus’ surface temperature and 
pressure with either C02 or N2 as test gas. Specimens 
tested included harness material samples, harness speci - 
mens used in modern jet engines, and samples of harness 
cut from a damaged Pioneer Venus temperature sensor. 
The harness samples incorporated “field joints” of the 
type made at the time the instruments were installed 
outside the pressure vessels during probe assembly. 
Preliminary tests showed that kapton, the material used to 
wrap the harness, was not discolored or severely degraded 
in C02 at 655 K and 55 bars for >30 min. However, when 
the Kynar shrink tubing used to enclose the Pioneer 
Venus field joints was tested, it was reduced to a black- 
ened ash at temperatures above 600 K. A pungent gas, 
later deduced to be hydrogen fluoride, was present in the 
chamber after the test. The source of the gas is believed to 
be the Kynar, which is a fluorinated hydrocarbon polymer 
called polyvinylidene fluoride. (The manufacturer’s 
literature states that Kynar decomposes-the polymer 
“unzips”-at temperatures above 600 K.) In tests of both 
the jet-engine harness and the Pioneer Venus temperature 
sensor harness, both including Kynar shrink tubing over 
field joints, insulation between the central conductors and 
the shielding dropped during test at temperatures just 
above 600 K from >lo0 megohms to c0.5 megohm (the 
minimum reading on the meter used). Insulation remained 
low for 2 to 3 min, then partially recovered, a behavior 
similar to that exhibited at 12 km on Venus in the 
Pioneer Venus temperature data (see fig. 3). Tests showed 
that this insulation loss occurred in N2 as well as C 0 2  
atmospheres. In all cases, the breakdown potential of the 
joints after test (voltage at which a dead short is indi- 
cated) was unacceptably low, 250 volts versus lo3 to 
104 volts expected. 
Interestingly, the kapton film used to wrap the leads 
was charred after tests in which Kynar degradation had 
occurred, probably as a result of attack by released 
hydrofluoric acid. The stainless steel walls of the test 
chamber were also discolored and pitted, and a white 
crystalline residue was deposited on the walls. When 
samples of this residue were mixed into water, the 
solution was sufficiently acid that it etched aluminum. 
Details of the shorting process have not been determined, 
but the highly corrosive hydrogen fluoride gas released 
would easily penetrate the braided metal shielding and the 
woven fiberglass insulation within the field joints, attack 
them and the lead wire, and leave deposits. The high- 
carbon-content ash left after decomposition of the Kynar 
polymer could also have infiltrated the fiberglass and 
contributed to the observed loss of insulation resistance. 
From a search through old records, it was found that 
Kynar shrink tubing was not in the joint specification at 
the time of the final design review. It was added some- 
time later, possibly during final integration on the factory 
floor. Problems were encountered in “dressing” the joints 
because of poor accessibility. Kapton provided a solution 
to these problems. Brief high-temperature tests were 
conducted to qualify this material for use. From the tests, 
it was concluded that the kapton degraded, but did not 
impair insulation resistance. It was subsequently used 
on connectors for the temperature sensors, the net flux 
radiometers, the microswitches indicating sensor 
deployment, and the nephelometer window heater 
(which apparently was not seriously affected by kilohm 
level shorts). 
The more recent tests strongly indicate that the 
decomposition of the Kynar shrink tubing was the 
central cause of the Pioneer Venus electrical anomalies. 
Disposition of “Unexplained Anomalies” 
in Table 2 
All of the anomalies can now be accounted for. In table 2, 
items 1,3, and 4 were satisfactorily explained at the 
outset. Items 2,5,6,7,  8, and 9 are explained by degraded 
insulation at external field joints. (Prior to the workshop, 
item 2 was mistakenly attributed to switch housing 
collapse.) Items 10 and 11 were not abnormhlities, but 
were within the usual expected limits of digital data. 
Therefore, there are no remaining unexplained anomalies. 
Summary and Recommendations 
The electrical anomalies experienced by all four 
Pioneer Venus Probes, starting between 12 and 13 km 
above the surface, resulted in a partial loss of science 
data below that altitude. Prior to late 1993, the cause 
of these anomalies had never been explained or under- 
stood. A workshop held at Ames Research Center 
September 28-29, 1993, brought together principal 
investigators and instrument engineers of affected 
experiments, spacecraft designers, project office 
personnel, and independent scientists in an attempt to 
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identify the cause of the anomalies. Objective evidence 
was reviewed, and possible causes were analyzed. 
The review showed that not all of the numerous listed 
anomalies were unexplained. For those that were 
unexplained, two areas of possible cause were considered: 
atmospheric phenomena and hardware failures. Atmo- 
spheric phenomena considered included: (1) Chemical 
interactions of atmospheric constituents with the probe 
and sensors, such as reactions of residual H2S04 fiom 
the clouds with harness or sensor materials, or C02 
oxidation of titanium parts and/or polymers. (2) Conden- 
sation of conductive vapors on the external sensors in the 
deep atmosphere, leading to shorted electrical circuits. 
(3) Probe charging followed by electrical breakdown of 
the atmosphere, leading to sparks that could possibly 
ignite probe external fires. None of these could be 
dismissed a priori. 
Of the hardware failures considered, the one identified as 
most likely to account for the anomalies was the insula- 
tion breakdown of the external harness, due to, for 
example, chemical interaction with the high pressure 
and temperature C02 atmosphere after exposure to the 
sulfuric acid clouds. Laboratory testing up to the time of 
the workshop did not conclusively rule this out. 
The workshop reached the conclusion that the anomalies 
experienced by the probes in the deep atmosphere can be 
prevented on future Venus probes through design changes 
and tests to verify design effectiveness. 
It was recommended that: 
1. 
evaluate harness failure mechanisms. Pioneer Venus 
probe harness and external sensors (where available) 
should be tested in C02 at pressures and temperatures 
encountered at and below the anomaly level. 
2. Greater emphasis should be placed on full simulation 
testing of probe external components in the development 
of future Venus probes. 
3. Atmospheric mechanisms described herein be further 
evaluated by means of laboratory and theoretical research. 
Subsequent to the workshop, recommended testing 
(item 1 above) was started and revealed the cause of the 
major anomalies to be insulation breakdown of the 
external harness due to the presence of an unqualified 
material. Although more research is needed to clarify 
and document the processes it appears that all of the 
anomalies have been explained. Furthermore, some of the 
atmospheric phenomena studied could be openings to 
important atmospheric research. 
Additional laboratory tests be initiated to critically 
! 
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Table 1. Anomalies experienced by the probes 
Anomaly probe 
Large North Day Night 
Temperature sensors apparently failed 
Changes and spikes in pressure data 
Apparent failure of net flux radiometer fluxplate temperature sensors 
Abrupt changes and spikes in data from net flux radiometer 
Change in the indicated deployment status of the atmosphere structure 
Erratic data from two thermocouples embedded in the heat shield 
Erratic data from a thermistor measuring junction temperature of the heat-shield 
Slight variation of current and voltage levels in the power bus 
Slight offsets or jumps in the values for temperatures of the forward and aft 
Abrupt changes in cloud particle size laser alignment monitor 
Decrease in the intensity of the beam returned to the cloud-particle-size 
Steady increase in flux readings of the infrared radiometer 
Noise in the data from the infrared radiometer 
Spikes in the data monitoring the ion pump current of the mass spectrometer 
Abrupt decrease of current in the power bus 
Jumps in the receiver (transponder) static phase error 
Spikes in the receiver automatic gain control 
Spurious reading from thermocouples that had been dropped from the probe in its 
temperature sensor and net flux radiometer booms 
thermocouples 
shelves and the internal pressure 
spectrometer 
analyzer 
heat shield 
X X X X 
X X X X 
X X X 
X X X 
X X X 
X X X 
X X X 
X X X 
X X X 
X NA NA NA 
X NA NA NA 
X NA NA NA 
X NA NA NA 
X NA NA NA 
X NA NA NA 
X NA NA N A  
X NA NA NA 
X NA NA NA 
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Table 2. Anomalies reported in NASA TM-84301 
Anomalous event Possible or mobable cause 
1. Pressure sensor offset jumps 
2. Small probe booms restowed 
3. Sudden decrease in large probe bus current 
4. Large probe infrared radiometer measured flux step change 
5. Discontinuous drop in AS1 temperatures 
6. NFR net flux data + zero 
7. NFR resistance thermometer temperature discontinuities 
8. Small probe heat shield thermocouples cold junction temperature 
9. Large probe thermocouple leads, cut by cable cutter, read 0.2 mv 
dropped 
signals 
Bursting of low range sensor diaphragms 
Microswitch failures at 640 K, 40 b 
LIR window heater failed 
LIR window heater failed 
Unexplained 
Unexplained 
Unexplained 
Unexplained 
Unexplained 
10. Pressure vessel internal pressure and temperature showed small step Unexplained 
11. Large probe communication electronics showed a shift in static phase Unexplained 
increases 
error and receiver AGC 
Table 3. Conditions at AS1 T sensor breakdown 
GRT,O sec GRT, hr:min Tcrit, K Pcrit9 b LVT,bhr Lat, deg 
Large probe 69,995 19:26.5 627.2 37.75 7.63 4.4 
Small probe 1 69,950 19:25.9 640.2 40.05 3.58 59.3 
Small probe 2 70,171 19:29.4 639.9 40.13 6.77 -3 1.2 
Small probe 3 70,259 19:31.0 633.3 36.32 0.12 -28.7 
aGround received time. 
b c a l  Venus time. 
CLatitude. 
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Figure 1. Descent configurations of the Pioneer Venus probes. (a) Small probe. 
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Figure 1. Concluded. (b) Large probe. 
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Figure 2. Data from the net flux radiometer late in the descent of the three small probes. Open symbols are net fluxes; 
filled symbols, atmospheric temperatures. 
19 
600 
560 
520 
520 
480 
3 440 
E 
400 
h 
?5 
l- 
360 
320 
280 
Sensor breakdown 
4 
+ + + + + + + + + +  
+t - 
Ti Data 
+ T2 Data 
Clouds 
Upper Middle Lower 
f 
f+ 
+t 
+++ 
++++ 
++ 
+++ 
++ 
Impact 
240 I I I I I  I I I I I I I I I t I  
0 240 480 720 960 1200 1440 1680 1920 2160 2400 2640 2880 3120 3360 
Time from start of descent (sec) 
Figure 3. Atmosphere structure instrument temperature sensor breakdowns. (a) Large probe. 
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Figure 3. Concluded. (b) North probe. 
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Figure 4. Soviet Venera Lander. (a) Photograph. 
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1 
Figure 4. Concluded. (b) Instrument locations; (1)  accelerometer, (2) particle size spectrometers, (3) mass spectrometer, 
(4) gas chromatograph (atmosphere and particles), (5) solar spectrometer photometer, (6) camera (used after landing), 
(7) soil mechanical properties and electrical conductivity instrument, (8) oxygen detector (9) (a) and (b) x-ray fluorescence 
spectrometers (soil chemical analysis), ( 1  0) soil sampling mechanism for x-ray fluorescence analysis, (1 1) descent 
pressure and temperature sensors, (12) microwave spectrometer, (13) hydrometer (measured atmospheric water content 
during descent), and (14) solar radiometer (measured luminosity during descent). 
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